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hWhether or not two forms of termination of fetal devel-
opment are similar depends on the element that one selects
to look at. One can look at the goal of the intervention, the
reason for intervening, etc. Already in 1992, Judith Daar
argued that ‘abortion and selective reduction are suffi-
ciently distinct to warrant distinct legal standards’ (Daar,
1992). In a similar vein, Legendre et al. (2013) argue that
selective termination and fetal reduction are different in
a medical and ethical sense. From an ethical point of view,
the main difference regards the goal of the intervention: in
the case of selective abortion the basic goal is the preven-
tion of the birth of a future child with a serious disability,
while in fetal reduction the main goal is to improve the
chance of survival and the quality of life of the remaining
fetuses. The combination of both aspects (when one fetus
of a multiple pregnancy has a disease) may be relatively
rare but it raises interesting ethical questions.
A standard method in bioethics is to reason by analogy.
For all analogies, there are numerous ethically relevant dif-
ferences and similarities with the problem at hand. This in
itself is no objection against their use (Mertes and Pennings,472-6483 ª 2013, Reproductive Healthcare Ltd. Published by Elsevier
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2013.02.0162010). It is sufficient to show that enough consistency exists
between source (the analogy proposed) and target (the
problem situation to be solved). When consistency has been
shown, the rule adopted in the source can be transferred to
the target. The field of abortion is packed with analogies. In
fact, one of the most famous analogies ever is Thomson’s
violinist. Thomson tried to show that, just as a person can-
not be forced to support another person who is plugged into
her for kidney dialysis for 9 months, a woman cannot be
forced to bring a fetus to term (Thomson, 1971).
Fetal reduction has been approached through the life-
boat analogy: fetuses in the womb are like passengers in a
lifeboat. In both situations, there is not enough room and/or
not enough resources for all of them to survive. There are
several possible actions that people can take when trapped
in a lifeboat: they can commit suicide to make room for the
others, throw others out of the boat (thus killing them) or
kill one (or several) and eat them so that they can stay alive.
Although there exists a general understanding that people
do ugly things when their lives are threatened, the
answer on which action is acceptable is far from evident.Ltd.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
526 G PenningsDeontologists who believe that one should not kill another
person will never condone the killing of one person for
the benefit of others. However, this brings us to another
analogy in which even deontologists might accept killing,
namely cases of self-defence. One could argue in specific
circumstances that the others are a threat to one’s life.
When resources are strictly limited, the part that is taken
by one person deprives another person of what he needs.
Fetuses have limited space and resources. However,
self-defence implies that one’s life is threatened. In case
of a multiple pregnancy, it is not one fetus killing another
but a third party (the doctor whose life is not endan-
gered) who intervenes. His/her actions cannot be justified
by self-defence. The doctor will have to refer to the util-
itarian argument of maximizing wellbeing and/or saving
lives. Saving a few fetuses with a higher quality of life
is preferable to risking the life of all fetuses or letting
a number of them be born with major malformations.
The reasoning underlying the lifeboat analogy is basically
utilitarian and so is the fetal reduction solution. Some
fetuses are sacrificed in order to increase the chances
of the remaining ones and to increase their future quality
of life. It could be argued that the fetal reduction case
more closely resembles the famous surgery analogy in
which a person who goes to the doctor is killed for his
organs to save five dying patients in need of an organ.
If one modifies this familiar analogy into one in which
the sacrificed person is him or herself also in need of
an organ, the analogy becomes even better. Notice that
the lifeboat analogy can only be used validly in specific
circumstances: namely when the chances of a fetus signif-
icantly increase by killing the another fetus, when the
killing does not hold a significant risk for the surviving
fetus and when the scarcity is such that not all can sur-
vive. These three conditions are rarely fulfilled in the
case for twins or even triplets.
Would the lifeboat analogy also help us to analyse the
selective termination case? Is it more acceptable to kill a
handicapped person in a lifeboat than an able-bodied per-
son? Again, it depends on the ethical theory that one
accepts. A utilitarian would prefer the killing of the hand-
icapped person if he has a lower chance of surviving due
to his condition. A deontologist will reject this idea and
will continue to defend the ‘no killing’ rule. Should the
selection of the person who will be killed be made at
random or can certain criteria be used (and if so which
criteria)? It is interesting that this point has been dis-
cussed within the fetal reduction context. There, one
seems to choose on the basis of a combination of ethical
and practical considerations (less developed fetuses, the
most easily accessible, least risk and so one) (Dickens
and Cook, 2008; Rochon and Stone, 2003). In the selective
termination cases, the ‘procreative beneficence’ principle
applies: if a couple can choose, they have a significant
reason to select the child whose life can be expected
to go best (Savulescu and Kahane, 2009). A difficult philo-
sophical problem we encounter here is the non-identity
problem: we cannot justify the selection and killing of
the fetus by pointing at the benefits for the future person
that his fetus will become since there will be no future
person (Parfit, 1984). There are two interesting pointshere. Firstly, in most cases that Legendre et al. (2013)
refer to, the issue is not the concern for the future per-
son since the conditions mentioned (such as anencephaly)
are invariably lethal. In a way, these cases are more univ-
ocal than those where the fetus is normal or affected by
a disease compatible with life: killing the affected fetus
does not even imply the intentional blocking of the possi-
bility that a fetus would become a future person since
that fetus would never, not even without human interven-
tion, become a person. Secondly, as we just saw, in cases
of abortion for medical reasons, we cannot justify the
killing by pointing at the benefits for the affected fetus.
We have two other options: we use either a wide per-
son-affecting form or an impersonal form (Savulescu and
Kahane, 2009). In the cases of selective termination, we
can use a special version of the wide person-affecting
form: besides preventing the harm of the birth of an
affected child, killing the affected fetus also significantly
increases the chances of survival of the unaffected fetus.
Of course, empirical data on the consequences of each
intervention should confirm this. As a philosopher, I can-
not help but imagine a number of more intricate cases.
What should one do when, for instance, a fetus is
affected by a disease that in normal circumstances would
not qualify for selective abortion but where the killing
would benefit the other twin? Or when the fetus has a
very serious disability compatible with life and the selec-
tive termination holds a significant risk for the
non-affected fetus? As Legendre et al. (2013) mentioned,
these conflicts of interests between the twins give rise to
difficult decisions.
I mentioned at the outset that source and target always
have similarities and differences. While this does not
automatically disqualify them, I believe that all the anal-
ogies presented above have one basic flaw in common:
fetuses are presented as persons. They all introduce the
idea that fetuses have interests as fetuses. This is false:
fetuses only have interests as potential future persons.
Whether or not a fetus will become a future person is
to a large extent determined by a person’s decision.
Although a number of the fetuses of a multiple pregnancy
will be born and thus will become persons (and to that
extent their interests should be taken into account), this
does not imply that those that are not born have been
persons that were killed. In fact, killing them does not
harm anyone since there was no person to begin with
and there never will be. According to the same line of
reasoning, one should adopt measures to make sure that
those fetuses that are planned to go to term have the
best possible life. Fetal reduction can be justified as an
intervention that increases the life chances and the qual-
ity of life of the remaining fetuses that will become per-
sons. Obviously, beside the future persons, also the
interests of the actual persons such as the future mother
count. Her psychological wellbeing and the realization of
her desire for a child are important in the balance. So,
even if the loss of the whole pregnancy or the death of
an unaffected fetus is not a harm caused to the fetuses,
it is still a significant harm to the would-be parents. When
this factor is taken into account, the preferable solution
is still the prevention of multiple pregnancies.
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